Friday 17 November 2017

Knox Your Block Off (1)

Chapter 15, part 1 sees the lengthy recitation of many failed British assaults on the Union's position at Fort Knox in Maine. Fortunately, we only need to look at the first to understand that they are complete nonsense.


We are told that the British naval force on this occasion consists of two 'sidewheel sloops', Magicienne and Valorous; the mortar frigates Eurotas and Horatio; and 'Lt. Edward Poulden’s squadron of gunboats, led by Stork'. Needless to say, none of these ships find favour with TFSmith.

Firstly, he describes Magicienne and Valorous as 'sidewheel sloops'. This is in line with his habit of rating British ships consistently lower than they actually were, though in this case he rates the paddle frigates two full grades smaller than they actually were. He points out that 'the sloops’ sidewheels were far too vulnerable to the guns of Fort Knox', which is thoroughly refreshing: the sidewheels of USS Mississippi proved almost impervious to the guns of HMS Racoon.

Secondly, he explains that 'the small gunboats had been built for coastal service, not riverine warfare'. This is rather surprising, as when TFSmith first introduced Poulden's flotilla in chapter 8 part 1, he described them as 'small 250-ton river and coastal gunboats built for the Crimea'. It is left to the reader to contemplate what aspects of a gunboat’s design might make it suitable for coastal but not for riverine warfare, or why the gunboats served for so long in the rivers of China if they were so inadequate for river service.

Thirdly, his overall conclusion of the force is that 'None of the ships were the most modern of their types'. If this is true for HMS Magicienne (launched 1849) and HMS Valorous (1851), it is odd that TFSmith does not highlight the same fact for USS Princeton (launched 1851), USS Susquehanna (1850), USS Powhatan (1850), USS Saranac (1848), USS Mississippi (1842), USS Cyane (1837), or USS St. Louis (launched 1828). These elderly warships belonging to the Union perform perfectly well: in many cases (1, 2, 3), inordinately well. Moreover, the mortar frigates may well actually be the most modern of their types. After all, both David Dixon Porter's mortar flotilla and the French mortar vessels were sailing schooners, whereas Horatio and Eurotas were screw powered- very helpful when it comes to manoeuvering into position.

Once again, TFSmith's research fails him. He has Eurotas and Horatio led by commanders, whereas historically they were assigned captains. Indeed, they had an unusually prestigious pair of captains during the Crimean War. Between 7 February 1855 and 12 May 1856, Horatio was under the command of Captain Arthur Auckland Leopold Pedro Cochrane, later to be the first captain of Warrior. Between 24 January 1856 and 27 September 1856, meanwhile, Eurotas was captained by William Moorsom, inventor of the Moorsom fuse and the Moorsom broadside director.

However, in many respects, the description of the ships engaged in the assault is its least worst aspect. As we will see, things start going downhill almost as soon as the guns open fire.

5 comments:

  1. It's very odd that TFSmith brings up the ages of these ships on this one occasion, because it so happens that HE is the one who assigned two old Royal Navy ships to this task (Magicienne and Valorous). Counting only screw frigates, there are more than two dozen newer vessels in the RN - if age was a problem for combat ops, you'd think the Magicienne and Valorous (as 'old' ships) would be assigned to relatively quiet blockade stations and that the newer, more heavily armed frigates or sloops would be used instead.
    Indeed, the Magicienne class seems a singularly bad choice for the job - they have a much deeper draft than most other British vessels, at 24 feet 6 inches, which is deeper than at least some ships of the line.
    I can't help but think that Donegal (1858, 21 foot draft) or Aboukir (engined 1858, 19 foot 2 inches draft) would be a better choice - that is, if the river's deep enough for Magicienne.

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  2. Brown's Before the Ironclad observes that the threat of damage to the wheel was very exaggerated. The French paddle steamer Fulton literally lost every bucket on one wheel and was still combat effective. Valorous actually had a damaged wheel in action during the Crimea and it barely effected her.

    As long as the wheel is turning, destroying some buckets does little.

    Now, some vessels have the drive in the superstructure. The USS Michigan is a prime example.

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  3. Re-reading this, I begin to wonder why the British even bother attacking in the first place. It doesn't offer any strategic advantage, and the blockade already shuts it up. Wouldn't these men and ships be better used opening up the sledge route or continuing the assaults on Portland?

    It seems as though the British just obligingly attack because there's a river and a fortified position.

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    Replies
    1. It's like how TFSmith has battles happen. There's two military forces close together, so a fight... happens.

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  4. It is worth noting that Fort Knox was completely indefensible from the rear. There were two higher hills behind it that dominated the fort, and the walls of the rear of the fort had not even been built. It was well understood that the rear of the fort needed to be defended at least in division strength.

    Bearing on the river, if rushed to arm the forts, would be 16x 32 pdrs in the casemates. The casemates could not fit the 10" Rodman and needed to be totally rebuilt. Most of the rest of the gun positions were for 24 pdr flank howitzers to defend the "in places non-existent" walls.

    TFS gives the British a full army corps under Bloomfield - he might call it a "division", but it fits the tactical pattern of a British Corps de Armee of the period. It is a force of 12,000 regular infantrymen.

    TFS says the British were "hemmed in" by Mt Tuck, but actually ascending Mt Tuck would be the British objective. As soon as Mt Tuck and the connected Mt Eustis are occupied by the British then Ft Knox is no longer tenable. Artillery completely dominates the fort, which can't respond. Of course, a small force of militia skirmishers can stop an entire Corps attack.

    If you wanted to smash Ft Knox for little risk, simply look at a topo map - https://www.topozone.com/maine/waldo-me/summit/mount-tuck/

    You could offload a dozen heavy guns onto Verona Island with a small security force (less than a battalion) and proceed to demolish Ft Knox.

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